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Why Keep U.S. Forces in Korea? 
By Edward A. Olsen 
The writer is professor of national security affairs at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and 
author of Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: 
In Due Course? The views expressed here are his own and 
do not represent those of the United States government 
As Americans and South Koreans prepare to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty in 
October, the combination of heightened North Korean nuclear 
brinkmanship and intensified South Korean anti-Americanism 
has rekindled the debate over keeping 37.000 United States 
troops in South Korea. That debate is likely to grow ifU .S.-South 
Korean frictions over how to deal with North Korea are exacer-
bated by striking policy differences between the Bush admin-
istration and the incoming Roh Moo Hyun government. 
The questionable merits of stationing large numbers of 
U . S. forces in Korea is not a new issue. As part of the Vietnam 
War-era "Nixon Doctrine" encouraging America's Asian allies 
to do more for themselves, Washington in 1971 withdrew 
20,000 of the 62.000 personnel then deployed in Korea-
despite Seoul's protests. Subsequently. Jimmy Carter's efforts 
to make substantial ground-force cuts fell apart amid renewed 
concerns about the North Korean threat, symbolized by the 
discovery of tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone. And post-
"Though the U.S. is averse to appeasement of 
North Korea, there are reasons to use incremental 
force cuts as bargaining chips in the peace process" 
Cold War efforts by presidents George Bush and later Bill Clin-
ton to scale back U.S. deployments in Korea as part of over-
all force reductions came to naught as a result of North Korea's 
first round of nuclear brinkmanship. This culminated in the 
cusp-of-war 1994 crisis that yielded the Agreed Framework 
that the North Koreans are now undercutting. In short, reduc-
ing U.S. forces in Korea is not a new idea, but steps in that 
direction have been limited by the perceived need to pre-
serve regional stability through a U.S. military tripwire 
designed to deter North Korea. 
Opposing the strategic status quo have been an array of dis-
senting liberals and libertarian/traditional conservative analysts 
in the U.S., who contend that America does too much for Korea 
and South Koreans should do more for their own defence. 
Establishment conservatives. nee-conservatives and liberal inter-
nationalists in the U.S. have rebutted such arguments in the 
name of preserving regional stability and constraining long-
term challenges to American geopolitical stature in the Asia-
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F)acific area. Recently, that has begun to change 
as establishment pundits-liberal and conserva-
tive--question the value of keeping u.s. forces in 
Korea to protect what they see as South Korean 
ingrates who do not appreciate America's benevo-
lent hegemony. What is new about these critics is 
the emotionally bitter tone of their advice. 
So far. the critics advocating U.S. force reduc-
tions have been fended off by establishment 
strategic logic. This centres on a continuing need 
to deter North Korea, the importance of a U.S. force 
presence in Korea vis-a-vis U.S. interests in neigh-
bouring Japan and China and the risks of appeas-
ing Pyongyang's extortionary policies. While this 
logic may prevail . it is also possible that new 
alternative categories of arguments could cause the 
U.S. to shift course. Three stand out. 
First. in the context of the U.S. war on terrorism 
and its corollary pressures to inculcate greater flex-
ibility and mobility within the armed forces , the 
static nature of the existing U. S. military deployment 
in Korea makes it out of date. A logical case can be 
made either to redeploy most of those forces else-
where to better purpose in the war on terrorism, 
or to dramatically reconfigure the ratio of U.S. 
ground, air and naval components within a smaller 
contingent of U.S. forces in Korea. Next. the logic of 
the Nixon Doctrine remains valid and could be 
adapted to the 21st century. Given South Korea's 
economic prowess. it can do far more unilaterally 
and multilaterally with regional neighbours to pro-
vide for Korean security and stability. It simply does 
not require as much from the U.S. any more. 
And finally. though the United States is averse 
to appeasement of North Korea. there are logical 
reasons to use incremental U.S. force cuts in Korea 
as bargaining chips in the inter- Korean peace 
process. It is entirely logical to trade off U.S. force 
cuts in South Korea for verifiable North Korean 
conventional-force demobilization and elimination 
of all its weapons of mass destruction. Such strate-
gic reciprocity would serve both U.S. and Korean 
security interests. 
These prospective methods are entirely con-
sistentwith U.S. stated objectives in Korea. Impor-
tantly. they would help bolster U.S.-South Korean 
harmony, serve as a catalyst for inter-Korean rec-
onciliation and enable the United States to refocus 
more of its defensive capabilities on salient aspects 
of the war on terrorism. The merits of the force-
cuts portion of this debate suggest it may yield 
innovative policy changes .• 
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